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COMMENTS
NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF
MARIJUANA: CAN THE TRIBES TURN ANOTHER
ADDICTION INTO AFFLUENCE?
Melinda Smith*
Introduction
For decades, Congress has enacted legislation without a fleeting thought
of the impact it will have on Native Americans. Today is no different.
Federal decriminalization of marijuana, with the apparent end-goal of
federal taxation of marijuana, is on the horizon. The multi-billion dollar
industry is not only home to large corporate interests, it has been an
abundant source for the startup of the ever idealized small businesses of
America. Unsurprisingly public opinion favoring decriminalization of
marijuana is at an all time high.
This comment explores the possibility of tribal involvement1 in the
thriving and ever-growing marijuana industry, and seeks to answer when, if
ever, it may be economically feasible for the tribes to enter the marijuana
market from a legal perspective. This article also posits that the same
restraints of American law that work to prevent tribal nations from enjoying
lucrative opportunities in the business of marijuana also work to deprive
tribes of the means to make any meaningful marijuana policy decisions
within their own communities. Ultimately, the best course of action begins
with the decriminalization of marijuana at the federal level through
legislation that expressly states how and when Congress intends the law to
apply to American Indians. This piece suggests, at the very least, the
enactment of a comprehensive piece of legislation that specifically
addresses the legal consequences and internal conflicts that result from the
application of ambiguous federal law to both sovereign Indian Nations and
sovereign states. This comment further proposes that Congress seize this
opportunity to create a framework under which federally recognized tribes

* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. The scope of this comment is limited to the “official activities of federally
recognized Tribes” within “Indian Country.” The legal ambiguity of classification within
these terms is extensive and beyond the consideration of the present piece.
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will have a chance to attain economic independence through meaningful
participation in a growing American industry.
Part I discusses the history and current status of marijuana law in the
United States, including the Controlled Substances Act, the Consolidated
and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, state decriminalization
and regulation of marijuana, the policies of the Department of Justice,
marijuana related issues raised in Indian Country, and the legal difficulties
faced by those in an industry prohibited by federal statute. Part II examines
possible models for tribal involvement in the marijuana industry by
examining the current status and continuing viability of Indian gaming,
tobacco, and hemp production. Part III gives an overview of proposed
federal legislation to end the federal prohibition of marijuana, tax
marijuana, and, less ambitiously, exclude industrial hemp from the
definition of marijuana within the Controlled Substances Act. Part IV
analyzes tribal involvement in the marijuana industry under both the
Controlled Substances Act and proposed federal legislation with an
emphasis on ambiguities likely to fuel litigation in the absence of express
congressional intent. Finally, Part V provides a new model for legislative
and judicial policy within the federal government regarding marijuana that
adequately and sufficiently balances state, federal, and tribal interests.
I. A Brief History of Marijuana Law and Policy
Although possession, manufacture, and sale of marijuana are illegal
under federal law,2 decriminalization is on the rise among states3 where the
industry has substantially spurred the economic growth of state treasuries
and private businesses alike.4 Those charged with enforcing the federal
marijuana prohibition have recently been acquiescent, but the possibility
that the Department of Justice (DOJ) may seek criminal recourse, or that
the United States might sue to enjoin the implementation of state regulation
preempted by federal law, leaves the legal future of the marijuana industry

2. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91513, Title II, § 102, 84 Stat. 1247 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C §§ 801-889 (2012)).
3. See infra Part I.B.
4. Jack Healy & Kirk Johnson, Next Gold Rush: Legal Marijuana Feeds Entrepreneurs’
Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2014, http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/us/new-gold-rushlegal-marijuana-feeds-entrepreneurs-dreams.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&ver
sion=HpSum&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=5&re
ferrer. The industry is projected to grow $2.6 billion this year. Id.
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in the dark.5 In an effort to cash in on recent events, federal legislation to
decriminalize and tax marijuana has been proposed, but has yet to be
enacted.6
A. The Controlled Substances Act
The use and sale of marijuana became federally prohibited in 1970 when
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act,7 commonly known as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).8 The act
classifies certain substances into one of five schedules based on “potential
for abuse”9 and “currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States.”10 Congress categorizes “[m]arihuana” as a Schedule I narcotic.11
Today, this unaltered classification continues to federally prohibit doctors
from prescribing marijuana,12 and provides a number of felony penalties for
the manufacture, distribution, and possession of marijuana.13 Penalties for
simple possession of marijuana range from civil penalties14 to felony
criminal penalties.15

5. See Sam Karmin, Cooperative Federalism and State Marijuana Regulation, 85 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1105 (2014).
6. See H.R. 4046, 113th Cong. (2014) (amending Office of National Drug Control
Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 by striking provisions which prohibit the Director of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy from studying the legalization of marijuana and
requires the Director to oppose any attempt to legalize marijuana); H.R. 499, 113th Cong.
(2013) (decriminalizing marijuana on the federal level, leaving states “a power to regulate
marijuana that is similar to the power they have to regulate alcohol”); H.R. J. Res. 79, 113th
Cong. (imposing a 50% federal tax on the sale of marijuana, by the producer or importer
thereof); H.R. 5226, 113th Cong. (2014) (“Charlotte's Web Medical Hemp Act of 2014”
amending the Controlled Substances Act to exclude therapeutic hemp and cannabidiol from
the definition of marihuana).
7. 21 U.S.C §§ 801-889 (2012).
8. See Karmin, supra note 5.
9. See 21 U.S.C. § 812.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Karmin, supra note 5, at 1106.
13. 21 U.S.C. § 841.
14. Id. § 844a. In assessing civil penalties the Attorney General has defined “Personal
Use Amount” as “possession of controlled substances in circumstances where there is no
other evidence of an intent to distribute, or to facilitate the manufacturing, compounding,
processing, delivering, importing or exporting of any controlled substance.” 28 C.F.R. § 76.2
(2014). Relevant evidence of a lack of this intent is the possession of a mixture or substance
containing detectable amounts of marijuana that does not exceed “one ounce.” Id.
15. 21 U.S.C. § 844.
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Not all enumerated controlled substances are illegal in every context, in
fact many of the substances are permitted in legitimate medical, scientific
and commercial channels. For example, Vicodin, a schedule II narcotic,
commonly prescribed to alleviate pain, may be possessed and ingested by a
person that has a valid prescription from a licensed physician. Under the
CSA, the Attorney General is authorized to “assist State, tribal, and local
governments in suppressing the diversion of controlled substances” from
legitimate channels into illegal channels and may make grants to these
governments to assist in meeting the costs of improving anti-diversion
regulatory controls.16 The Attorney General is similarly authorized to “enter
into contractual agreements with State, tribal, and local law enforcement
agencies to provide for cooperative enforcement” of the CSA.17
In lieu of legislative amendment or repeal, the CSA likewise authorizes
the Attorney General to remove substances from the established schedules,
by rules promulgated in accordance with the procedures set out in the Act,
should he or she find that the substance fails to “meet the requirements for
inclusion in any schedule.”18 The Attorney General may promulgate a rule
to remove a listed substance if the substance’s potential for abuse is
outweighed by the substance’s accepted medical use.19 In making this
determination, the Attorney General must consider: (1) the drug's actual or
relative potential for abuse; (2) scientific evidence of its pharmacological
effects, if known; (3) the state of current scientific knowledge regarding the
drug or other substance; (4) its history and current pattern of abuse; (5) the
scope, duration, and significance of abuse; (6) what, if any, risk there is to
the public health; (7) its psychological or physiological dependence
liability; and (8) whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a
controlled substance.20
The CSA provides that it shall not preempt state law “unless there is a
positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State
16. Id. § 873(a), (d). In addition to grants, the AG may assist by:
(A) making periodic assessments of the capabilities of State, tribal, and
local governments to adequately control the diversion of controlled substances;
(B) providing advice and counsel to State, tribal, and local governments on
the methods by which such governments may strengthen their controls against
diversion; and
(C) establishing cooperative investigative efforts to control diversion . . . .
Id. § 873(a)(6).
17. Id. § 873(a)(7).
18. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.”21 Given that this
provision was simply intended to provide concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction for criminal prosecution under both federal and state law, it is
unlikely Congress contemplated that this would be as controversial as it has
proven to be.22
In interpreting this provision, courts have generally established that a
state medical marijuana law is in “positive conflict” with the CSA if it is
“physically impossible” to comply with both the state and federal law, or
where the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”23
In Gonzales v. Raich,24 a 6-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
“the Commerce Clause permitted Congress to prohibit the wholly intrastate
possession and use of marijuana.”25 However, the Court failed to consider
whether the CSA preempted the state law at issue,26 leaving the question of
the effect of the Supremacy Clause unanswered.
B. State Decriminalization and Regulation of Marijuana
In 2013, Deputy Attorney General Cole issued a memorandum to all
U.S. Attorneys announcing that although the DOJ retains the power and
conviction to enforce the CSA, it will leave marijuana law enforcement to
the local authorities if the states carefully regulate the marijuana market in
accordance with federal priorities.27 In order to tentatively avoid
prosecution and enjoinment for violating the CSA, a state’s marijuana
regulatory scheme must include legal and enforcement mechanisms that
adequately address the following eight federal priorities: (1) preventing the
distribution of marijuana to minors; (2) preventing revenue from the sale of
marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; (3)
preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under
21. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (emphasis added).
22. See, e.g., People v. Sheppard, 432 N.Y.S.2d 467 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
23. TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42398, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE, FEDERALISM, AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS
(2012) (referencing the differing holdings between Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau
of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518 (Or. 2010), and County of San Diego v. San Diego Norml,
165 Cal. App. 4th 798 (2008)).
24. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
25. See GARVEY, supra note 23, at 5 (citing Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1).
26. Id.
27. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Office of the Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/
resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
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state law in some form to other states; (4) preventing drugged driving (5)
preventing the exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences
associated with marijuana use; (6) preventing the growing of marijuana on
public lands; (7) preventing the attendant public safety and environmental
dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; and (8) preventing
marijuana possession or use on federal property.28
To date, the use of marijuana for medical purposes has been
decriminalized in twenty-three states29 and the District of Columbia.30
Seventeen other states have approved non-comprehensive medical
marijuana programs where, for example, the state permits only the use of
products that are less psychoactive than recreational marijuana, meaning the
products contain low amounts of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and contain
high amounts of cannabidiol (CBD).31 In 2012, Colorado32 and
Washington33 enacted legislation decriminalizing the recreational use of
28. Id. These same eight guidelines apply to the growth and use of marijuana in Indian
Country under a similar memorandum issued by the DOJ on October 28, 2014. See infra
note 45.
29. States with comprehensive legislation legalizing marijuana for medicinal purposes
include Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See State Medical
Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.ncsl.
org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx.
30. Prior to 2014, twenty-one states and D.C. had decriminalized and regulated
medicinal marijuana in some way. Id. In 2014, New York and Minnesota joined the ranks.
Id. There is widespread global advocacy for the medicinal use of marijuana. Quick
Reference, NORML, http://norml.org/marijuana/item/quick-reference?category_id=734 (last
visited Sept. 27, 2014) (providing a list of health organization that support immediate legal
access to medical marijuana).
31. State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 29. Recent Research suggests that the
medicinal benefits of non-psychoactive CBD include the reduction of anxiety, nausea,
seizure activity, tumors and cancer cells. 5 Must-Know Facts About Cannabidiol (CBD),
LEAF SCIENCE (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.leafscience.com/2014/02/23/5-must-know-factscannabidiol-cbd/.
32. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (“[T]he following acts are not unlawful and shall not
be an offense under Colorado law or the law of any locality within Colorado or be a basis for
seizure or forfeiture of assets under Colorado law for persons twenty-one years of age or
older . . . [p]ossessing, using, displaying, purchasing, or transporting marijuana accessories
or one ounce or less of marijuana.”).
33. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.4013 (West 2014) (“The possession, by a person
twenty-one years of age or older, of useable marijuana or marijuana-infused products in
amounts that do not exceed those set forth in RCW 69.50.360(3) is not a violation of this
section, this chapter, or any other provision of Washington state law.”).
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marijuana by adults over the age of twenty-one. Similar measures to
legalize recreational marijuana passed in Alaska34 and Oregon35 in
November of 2014.36
C. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 201537
In December of 2014, Congress strengthened the administration’s
implied promise to decline federal prosecution under the CSA for the sale
of medicinal marijuana by providing that DOJ funds cannot be used to
enforce the federal marijuana prohibition in states which have legalized
medical marijuana.38 In the same appropriations act, Congress made an
additional implied policy statement regarding hemp production, by
preventing the DOJ and Drug Enforcement Administration from using
appropriated funds to prosecute those institutions of higher education and
state departments of agriculture that have been authorized to grow hemp for
research or establish agricultural pilot programs under the Legitimacy of
Industrial Hemp Research section of the Agricultural Act of 2014.39
D. Indian Country: Monkey in the Middle
The registration requirements40 and civil penalties41 of the CSA apply to
“any person,” and arguably as a function of the Supremacy Clause,42 apply

34. Alaska Marijuana Legalization, Ballot Measure 2 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/Alaska_Marijuana_Legalization,_Ballot_Measure_2_%282014%29
(last visited Jan. 7, 2015) (“As a result of its passage, the measure allowed people age 21 and
older to possess up to one ounce of marijuana and up to six plants. It also made the
manufacture, sale and possession of marijuana paraphernalia legal.”).
35. Noelle Crombie, Marijuana legalization Q&A: What's Next for Oregon?,
OREGONLIVE (Nov. 05, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/
2014/11/marijuana_legalization_oregon.html (“[In July of 2015] [p]eople 21 and older will
be allowed to possess up to 1 ounce of marijuana in a public place and up to 8 ounces in
their home. The law also allows up to four marijuana plants per household.”).
36. Healy & Johnson, supra note 4.
37. Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2130.
38. Id. tit. V, § 538, 128 Stat. at 2217.
39. Id. at tit. V, § 539, 128 Stat. at 2217. The Legitimacy of Industrial Hemp Research
section requires that sites used for growing or cultivating industrial hemp be in states where
hemp is legal and certified by, and registered with, the State department of agriculture. 7
U.S.C. § 5940(a) (2012).
40. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 822(a)(1) (2012) (“Every person who
manufactures or distributes any controlled substance or list I chemical, or who proposes to
engage in the manufacture or distribution of any controlled substance or list I chemical, shall
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to all tribal members, even those in states which have assumed criminal
jurisdiction over tribal land within the state.43 However the CSA does not
appear to apply to the official activities of the tribes themselves, leaving
them with their sovereign power, buttressed by immunity from suit, to enact
tribal ordinances that differ from the CSA.44
In 2014, in response to “requested guidance on the enforcement of the
Controlled Substance Act (CSA) on tribal lands by the United States
Attorneys’ offices,”45 the DOJ issued a memorandum to all U.S. Attorneys,
Assistant Attorneys, Criminal Chiefs, Appellate Chiefs, Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement Task Force Coordinators and Tribal Liaisons stating
that, on a case-by-case basis, the “eight priorities in the Cole Memorandum
will guide United States Attorneys’ marijuana enforcement efforts in Indian
Country, including in the event that sovereign Indian Nations seek to
legalize the cultivation or use of marijuana in Indian Country.”46 The
memo further provides that “[c]onsistent with the Attorney General’s 2010
Indian Country Initiative,” U.S. Attorneys should consult with tribes on a
government-to-government basis when evaluating a tribe’s marijuana
obtain annually a registration issued by the Attorney General in accordance with the rules
and regulations promulgated by him.”).
41. See Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally—(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess
with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance . . . .”).
42. See GARVEY, supra note 23.
43. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960)
(holding that “a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their
property interests”); Vandever v. Osage Nation Enter., Inc., No. 06-CV-380-GKF-SAJ, 2007
WL 6139198, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 6, 2007) (“This general rule, known as the Tuscarora
rule, ‘presumes that when Congress enacts a statute of general applicability, the statute
reaches everyone within federal jurisdiction not specifically excluded, including Indians and
Tribes.’ Broad application of the Tuscarora rule, however, has been whittled down over the
years.”) (internal citations omitted); see Robin Lash, Industrial Hemp: The Crop for the
Seventh Generation, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 313, 344 (2002-2003).
44. See, e.g., Oglala Sioux Tribal Council Ordinance No. 98-27 (July 28, 1998),
available at https://www.votehemp.com/PDF/OrdinanceNo9827.pdf; United States v. White
Plume, 447 F.3d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 2006) (demonstrating that the United States acts to
enjoin individual members of a tribe from violating the CSA while avoiding the issue of the
tribe’s authority to pass an ordinance in direct contradiction with the CSA).
45. See Monty Wilkinson, Office of the Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Policy
Statement Regarding Marijuana Issues in Indian Country (Oct. 28, 2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/pages/attachments/2014/12/11/policystateme
ntregardingmarijuanaissuesinindiancountry2.pdf.
46. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). For the Cole Memorandum standards, see discussion
supra Part I.B.
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enforcement activities, and should inform the executive before making any
determination on how to proceed when tribal regulation does not meet the
eight Cole Memorandum standards.47 The 2014 memorandum was not the
first instance of a federal Native American exemption from the CSA; the
Native American Church has received an exemption allowing peyote use—
a Schedule I narcotic—for the past forty-three years.48 In 1994, Congress
further exempted “the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by an
Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the
practice of a traditional Indian religion” from the CSA’s criminal
penalties,49 providing that such activity shall not be prohibited by the
United States or any State.50
The impact of the memorandum in Indian Country is not immediately
clear. At least one tribe, the Oglala Sioux of Pine Ridge Reservation in
South Dakota, has taken steps toward legalization of marijuana on the
reservation. In 2015 the Wounded Knee district of the Pine Ridge
Reservation passed a motion legalizing “the sale of medicinal and
recreational marijuana as well as industrialized hemp” but the remaining
nine districts and the tribal council have yet to weigh in on the issue.51 In
addition, a recent Indian Country Today Media Network article claims that
some tribal members are currently cultivating, using, and selling 100%
organic marijuana on a rancheria in Northern California.52 One of the
anonymous tribal members growing marijuana on the reservation stated that
he was a recovering alcoholic and meth addict, and that smoking marijuana
47. Wilkinson, supra note 45, at 2-3.
48. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 433
(2006) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2005)).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2012).
50. Id. (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or
transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be
prohibited by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or discriminated
against on the basis of such use, possession or transportation, including, but not limited to,
denial of otherwise applicable benefits under public assistance programs.”) (emphasis
added).
51. Brandon Ecoffey, Oglala Sioux District Endorses Marijuana, LAKOTA COUNTRY
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2015, http://www.indianz.com/News/2015/017115.asp; see also Joe
O'Sullivan, Pine Ridge Reservation Considers Legalizing Marijuana, RAPID CITY J., Feb. 2,
2014, 5:00 AM, http://rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/pine-ridge-reservation-considerslegalizing-marijuana/article_af9b0f7c-cb6b-504a-a11a-6e8da8005087.html.
52. See Ruth Hopkins, Cannabis on the Rez: When Will It Be Legal?, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Apr. 25, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
2014/04/25/cannabis-rez-when-will-it-be-legal.
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prevented him from relapsing.53 When asked how so much marijuana could
be illegally grown, he pointed out that the rancheria is located in California,
a Public Law 280 (PL 280) state where, in the absence of tribal law
enforcement, state law enforcement was lax.54 A second grower discussed
his hopes for promoting tribal sovereignty through tribal taxation of
marijuana produced and sold on the reservation, and was actively lobbying
his tribal council to legalize cannabis so that the tribe could have its own
nursery.55 Dismayed at the wasteful agricultural methods of other marijuana
producers, he also hoped to teach others how to grow marijuana in a more
environmentally friendly way, specifically more efficient water irrigation
systems and safer waste disposal methods.56
Conversely, many Native Americans remain staunchly opposed to tribal
legalization
of
marijuana,
even
while
supporting
federal
decriminalization.57 For example, Troy A. Eid, chair of the National Indian
Law and Order Commission, recently authored an opinion piece discussing
the detrimental effects of diversion into tribal communities and concluding
that “[o]nly federally authorized decriminalization of marijuana that
respects the prerogatives of states and tribes can ensure a concerted national
enforcement strategy against marijuana diversion.”58
In Indian communities in those states where marijuana is legal under
state law, tribal courts struggle to balance tribal, state, and federal law.59
For example, in the Swimosh Indian Tribal Community, located in
Washington, under the Swimosh Code, “‘if there is . . . any doubt as to
whether a substance is illegal or not’ the tribal court may turn to [the laws
of the state of Washington] for guidance.”60 In addition, under Swimosh
law, “[a]n independent sovereign may fully incorporate by reference the
laws of another sovereign.”61 Despite these attempts at uniformity among
state and tribal criminal law, the incongruence with federal law creates an
interesting conundrum. Under Washington state law, the possession of
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Troy A. Eid, Indian Youth Hurt by Colorado's Marijuana Experiment, DENVER
POST, July 26, 2014, 5:01 PM, http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_26216404/indianyouth-hurt-by-colorados-marijuana-experiment.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. See, e.g., Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. McLeod, 11 Am. Tribal Law 187
(2012).
60. Id. at 188 (citing SWINOMISH TRIBAL CODE 4.10.020(B)).
61. Id. at 189 (citing Wiley v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 2 C.C.A.R. 60 (1995)).
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certain amounts of marijuana is authorized for those with a written
authorization for medical use of marijuana from a medical provider.62
Under Swimosh law possession of marijuana is authorized only for those
with a valid prescription from a medical provider.63 However, as the tribal
court in Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. McLeod points out,
“[m]arijuana . . . may not be prescribed under Federal law,”64 and therefore
its possession remains illegal under the tribal statute.
E. The Persistent Legal Consequences of Federal Half-Measures
Despite the DOJ’s declarations that U.S. Attorneys will likely turn a
blind eye to marijuana use if decriminalizing states and tribes maintain a
tight ship, and a 2015 federal appropriations act that ensures the DOJ will
not prevent states from implementing their medical marijuana laws, in the
shadow of uncertainty cast by the CSA, significant challenges continue to
plague the $1.5 billion marijuana industry.65 Notably, courts may deem a
contract for a cannabis-related transaction, including business loan
agreements, to be void as against public or federal policy because marijuana
remains a federally prohibited Schedule I narcotic.66 Because contract law
applies to tribal-state compacts, which serve to enforce agreements between
tribes and states in the areas of self-governance, taxation, and criminal
jurisdiction,67 cannabis related compacts would likely face similar barriers
to enforceability in a court of law.68 Banks and other financial institutions
often refuse to do business with the marijuana industry for fear of federal
prosecution for money laundering,69 and adequate legal advice may be hard
62. Id. at 188.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Healy & Johnson, supra note 4.
66. Karmin, supra note 5, at 1113.
67. See Jeff Corntassel, Indigenous Governance Amidst the Forced Federalism Era,
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47 (2009).
68. See, e.g., Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006).
69. Id. The threat of prosecution for money laundering has rendered the marijuana
business a cash-only business, making it a target for violent crime. Id. “A financial
institution that knowingly processes transactions for marijuana-related businesses commits
the crime of money laundering.” Jacob Sullem, Marijuana Money Is Still a Pot of Trouble
for Banks, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2014, 5:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/
2014/09/18/local-banks-terrified-by-friendly-neighborhood-marijuana-merchants/ (quoting
Julie Anderson Hill, J.D.). However,
[t]he Obama administration on [Feb. 14, 2014] issued new law-enforcement
guidelines aimed at encouraging banks to start doing business with statelicensed marijuana suppliers . . . .

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

518

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

to come by because rules of professional conduct prohibit legal counsel
from “knowingly facilitating criminal conduct.”70
In addition to these inherent legal complications, those involved in the
marijuana industry incur substantial expenses, payable to the state, in
licensing fees71 and taxes.72 For example, “Colorado voters approved a 15%
excise tax on marijuana producers . . . and a 10% special sales tax on
consumers.”73
Finally, the discord between states which have legalized marijuana and
states and tribes which continue to prohibit its production, use, and
possession, remains an extremely hot political topic that fuels litigation not
easily resolved in light of the glaring contradiction within the federal
position on marijuana. The prominent issue is what is known as
“diversion,”74 the leakage of state-legalized cannabis products into states
and territories that continue to outlaw marijuana.
....
The guidance stopped short of promising immunity for banks. But it said
criminal prosecution for money laundering and other crimes is unlikely if banks
meet a series of conditions, such as avoiding business with marijuana
operations that sell to minors or engage in illegal drug trafficking.
David Ingram & Jason Lange, U.S. to Let Banks Do Business with Licensed Pot Shops,
REUTERS, Feb. 14, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/15/us-usa-marijuanabanking-idUSBREA1D1I520140215.
70. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d at 1116-17.
71. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55-075 (2015) (“The annual fee for issuance
and renewal of a marijuana producer license is one thousand dollars.”).
72. Jolie Lee, Colorado Makes $3.5M in Pot Revenue in January, USA TODAY, Mar.
11, 2014, 11:39 AM, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/03/10/marijua
na-revenue-colorado-taxes/6261131/.
73. Id.
74. The prevention of diversion is one of the eight priorities listed on the Cole
Memorandum, which, in order to avoid prosecution by U.S. Attorneys, those states and
tribes who wish to legalize marijuana in any form must enforce through an effective
regulatory scheme. See discussion supra Part I.B. In the context of diversion from states to
Indian Country,
[t]he promoters of both [Colorado and Washington measures permitting
recreational use and sales] vowed that marijuana wouldn't be diverted to places
where it's still illegal. Places like Pine Ridge, or the Yakima Nation in central
Washington State. The Washington marijuana initiative, incidentally, exempted
Yakima and other tribes from state marijuana legalization because Indian
nations are sovereign — governments entitled to make and enforce their own
laws that meet the needs of their citizens. Still, Washington-labeled marijuana
is reportedly showing up at Yakima, too. Tribal leaders are so outraged they
want to extend their marijuana ban to all areas of Washington State covered by
the Yakima Nation's original treaty with the United States.
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For example, in December of 2014, the Attorney Generals of Nebraska
and Oklahoma filed a lawsuit in the U.S. Supreme Court asking the Court
to declare Colorado’s legalization of marijuana in violation of the
Constitution.75 Released to the press, an unsigned and unstamped copy of
the Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Brief in Support of Motion to File
Complaint, and Complaint assert that Colorado’s cannabis legalization laws
are preempted by federal law (the CSA) and thus violate the Supremacy
Clause.76 As a somewhat secondary argument, the complaint attacks the
adequacy of Colorado’s regulatory scheme as failing to “ensure marijuana
cultivated and sold in Colorado is not trafficked to other states.”77 Until the
federal government solidifies and communicates a consistent federal
marijuana policy, pro-legalization governmental interests will continue to
increasingly face off with anti-legalization governmental interests in court
systems across the country. Although this dispute initially took root in
highly polarized public opinion concerning drug policy, it is now cultivated
by the significant financial interests of governmental and private
commercial interests.
II. Possible Models for Tribal Marijuana Revenue: Tobacco Sales, Indian
Gaming, and Industrial Hemp Production
As of June 2014, total revenue from marijuana taxes, licenses, and fees
in Colorado “topped 7 million dollars” and is projected “to keep rising as
more retail outlets enter the market.”78 In contrast, “[t]he poverty and
unemployment rates on Indian reservations are significantly greater than the
national average. As a result, ‘there is no stable tax base on most

Eid, supra note 57.
75. John Ingold, Nebraska and Oklahoma Sue Colorado over Marijuana Legalization,
DENVER POST, Dec. 18, 2014, 1:12 PM, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_27163543/
nebraska-and-oklahoma-sue-colorado-over-marijuana-legalization?source=infinite.
76. Complaint at ¶ 4, Nebraska & Oklahoma v. Colorado, No. 144 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2014)
(“The Constitution and the federal anti-drug laws do not permit the development of a
patchwork of state and local pro-drug policies and licensed-distribution schemes throughout
the country which conflict with federal laws.”).
77. Id. ¶ 5.
78. Christopher Ingraham, Colorado Marijuana Tax Revenues Surge as Recreational
Sales Surpass Medical, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/09/11/colorado-marijuana-tax-revenues-surge-as-recreational-sal
es-surpass-medical-for-the-first-time/.
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reservations.’”79 With money flowing to the pockets of private industry,80 as
well as to the twenty-four states and the District of Columbia which have
legalized marijuana use in the face of federal prohibition,81 it is no surprise
that some tribal members are considering entering into the “Wild West”
that is the marijuana industry.82 In analyzing the economic feasibility of
tribal participation in the marijuana market, it is beneficial to examine the
successes, failures and mechanics of similar tribal ventures in Indian
gaming, Indian tobacco and hemp production.
A. Indian Gaming
The revenue-generating power of Indian casinos rests on the principles
of tribal sovereign immunity from the civil regulatory power of the states.
In the 1980s, “numerous Indian tribes [became] engaged in or [licensed]
gambling activities in Indian country as a means of generating tribal
government revenue.”83 In response, many states attempted to prevent tribes
from engaging in gaming altogether or imposed restrictions on tribal
gaming.
Eventually the question of immunity from state regulation reached the
U.S. Supreme Court in the influential case California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians,84 in which the Court held “the State's interest in preventing
the infiltration of the tribal bingo enterprises by organized crime d[id] not
justify state regulation of the tribal bingo enterprises in light of the
compelling federal and tribal interests supporting [the continued operation
of the tribal bingo enterprises].”85 Underlying the Court’s decision was the
distinction between “criminal/prohibitory” and “civil/regulatory” laws in
PL 280 states.86 The Court reasoned that PL 28087 permitted these states
79. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (quoting Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development as
a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759, 774).
80. Healy & Johnson, supra note 4.
81. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 29.
82. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 51.
83. Id. at 3.
84. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
85. Id. at 221-22.
86. Id. at 208 (“[W]hen a State seeks to enforce a law within an Indian reservation
under the authority of Pub.L. 280, it must be determined whether the law is criminal in
nature, and thus fully applicable to the reservation under § 2, or civil in nature, and
applicable only as it may be relevant to private civil litigation in state court.”).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2014). “In Pub.L. 280, Congress expressly granted six States,
including California, jurisdiction over specified areas of Indian country within the States and
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broad criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country within the State, as well as
civil jurisdiction over private litigation involving reservation Indians in
state court, but that the statute did not grant general civil regulatory
authority.88 More recently, the Supreme Court proclaimed that Cabazon
“held that States lacked regulatory authority over gaming on Indian
land[s].”89
Despite this favorable ruling, some tribes expressed concern that their
tribal regulatory schemes and limited enforcement powers were insufficient
to adequately protect their gambling operations from “the influence of
organized crime, racketeers, [and] professional gamblers.”90 In response,
Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).91 Of notable
import, the legislative history of the IGRA provides that “tribal operation
and licensing of gambling activities [was in fact] a legitimate means of
generating revenues for governmental operations and programs.”92
The IGRA applies only to gaming on “Indian lands,” which is defined as
lands within reservation boundaries, lands held in trust, and allotment
lands.93 The IGRA establishes the National Indian Gaming Commission
(NIGC) within the Department of the Interior (DOI), which is authorized to
promulgate regulations, conduct investigations, adjudicate, and approve an
annual budget for the Commission.94 As the statutory backbone of the
federal regulatory scheme, the IGRA is predominantly enforced through the
administrative approval or denial of statutorily requisite tribal ordinances or
resolutions,95 operational or management contracts to which the tribes are a
party,96 and tribal-state compacts.97 Tribal ordinances or resolutions must
provided for the assumption of jurisdiction by other States.” California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987).
88. Id. at 209.
89. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2034 (2014).
90. Indian Gambling Control Act: Hearing on H.R. 4566 Before the H. Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong. 9-10 (1984) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4566].
91. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2013)).
92. Hearing on H.R. 4566, supra note 90, at 9-10.
93. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4).
94. Id. § 2706. Although one might imagine that federal oversight of such a specifically
tribal activity would be conducted by a branch, division, office, or agency within the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, IGRA established the National Indian Gaming Commission as a separate
entity within the Department of the Interior. Id. § 2704.
95. Id. § 2710(b).
96. Id. §§ 2710(d)(9), 2711(g), 2711(a)(1). “By regulation, unapproved management
contracts are deemed ‘void.’” Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm’t. Corp., 547 F.3d
115, 120 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 25 C.F.R. § 533.7 (2008)).
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conform to the IGRA and require the approval of the Chairman of the
NIGC.98 While tribal-state compacts require the approval of the Secretary
of the Interior, the IGRA transfers the authority to approve gaming related
management contracts from the Secretary of the Interior to the NIGC.99
The core regulatory framework of the IGRA divides Indian gaming
activities into three classes. Class I gaming, which is either traditional
gaming associated with tribal ceremonies or social gaming for prizes of
only minimal value,100 enjoys immunity from both state and federal
regulation.101 Class II gaming, “essentially bingo and certain card games
can be regulated on Indian lands by states only if those games are
prohibited for everyone under all circumstances.”102 The real revenue, as
well as the most substantial risk of unfavorable state regulation, lies in
Class III gaming, which consists of all forms of gaming not included in
Class I or II.103 Under the IGRA, the most significant state involvement in
Class III gaming occurs primarily through two legal avenues: first, the
drafting and enforcement of tribal-state compacts; and second, federal
preemption workarounds.
To engage in Class III gaming, a tribe must first, pass an ordinance or
resolution to legalize gaming;104 second, be “located in a state that permits
such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity”; and
third, negotiate a compact agreement between the tribe and the state.105 The
97. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(A).
98. Id. § 2710(b). Tribal ordinances or resolutions must include provisions specifying
the use of net revenue in accordance with the statutory requirements. Id.
99. Id. § 2711; see also United States ex rel. Mosay v. Buffalo Bros. Mgmt., Inc., 20
F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1992)).
100. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6).
101. Kurtis A. Kemper, Preemption of State Law by Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 27
A.L.R. FED. 2D 93, § 2 (2008).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(2)(A) (2012). The section provides:
If any Indian tribe proposes to engage in, or to authorize any person or entity to
engage in, a class III gaming activity on Indian lands of the Indian tribe, the
governing body of the Indian tribe shall adopt and submit to the Chairman [of
the National Gaming Commission] an ordinance or resolution that meets the
requirements of subsection (b) of this section [which includes conditions on the
spending of revenue, the requirement of a specific tribal regulatory scheme and
the imposition of National Gaming Commission audits and oversight].
Id.
105. Kemper, supra note 101 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2701(d) (2012)).
Any Tribal-State compact negotiated under [IGRA] may include provisions
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IGRA section 2701(d)(3)-(9) provides the procedure, scope, and general
requirements of tribal-state gaming compacts. In sum:
A tribe seeking to conduct class III gaming on Indian land must
request that the state negotiate with the tribe in an attempt to
develop a tribal-state compact. The state must negotiate in good
faith to enter into a compact, and any tribal-state compact is
subject to approval by the National Indian Gaming
Commissioner. It is through the compacting process that the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) (25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701 et
seq.) allows states to have input into how class III gaming will
be conducted—authority that is limited in that if the state does
not negotiate or fails to negotiate in good faith, a tribe may bring
suit in federal district court, the parties will be ordered to
conclude a compact within a 60-day period, if the parties do not
agree to a compact, mediation is required, and if the state still
does not agree or invokes its 11th Amendment immunity, the
Secretary of the Interior and the tribe will decide upon
procedures for conducting class III gaming.106
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of state Eleventh Amendment
immunity under the IGRA in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.107 The
Seminole Tribe filed suit to compel Florida to negotiate a tribal-state
relating to:
(i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the
Indian tribe or the State that are directly related to, and necessary for, the
licensing and regulation of such activity;
(ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the
Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations;
(iii) the assessment by the State of such activities in such amounts as are
necessary to defray the costs of regulating such activity;
(iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts comparable to
amounts assessed by the State for comparable activities;
(v) remedies for breach of contract [including waivers of sovereign
immunity];
(vi) standards for the operation of such activity and maintenance of the
gaming facility, including licensing; and
(vii) any other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming
activities.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C).
106. Kemper, supra note 101 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3); 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7);
Dalton v. Pataki, 5 N.Y.3d 243 (2005)).
107. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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gaming compact in good faith pursuant to the IGRA.108 The Court held that
not only did Congress lack the authority to abrogate the state’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity, the doctrine of Ex parte Young is likewise
unavailable to tribes seeking enforcement of the IGRA’s requirements.109
Ultimately, a tribe may not compel a state to negotiate under the IGRA’s
remedial scheme because the state is immune from suit. Because the IGRA
provides the remedial scheme specifically designed for enforcement of the
right to compel the state to negotiate, a tribe cannot sue a state official in
their official capacity to enforce that right under the Ex parte Young
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.110
In contrast, the IGRA section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) expressly abrogates tribal
sovereign immunity for Class III gaming on Indian lands which violates a
tribal-state compact.111 In Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,112 the
state sought to enjoin a tribe from operating an off-reservation casino that
the tribe had purchased.113 Michigan contended that the casino was not on
“Indian lands” for purposes of the IGRA, and as a consequence it violated
the tribal-state compact that prohibited off-reservation gaming facilities
within the state.114 The DOI issued an opinion confirming Michigan’s claim
that because the off-reservation casino could not be converted into a casino
on “Indian lands” simply because it was purchased by the tribe with Land
Trust earnings.115 In a nearly comical twist at Michigan’s expense, the
Court held that the IGRA expressly abrogates tribal sovereign immunity
only for gaming activities occurring on Indian lands, and thus sovereign
immunity barred the state from enjoining the tribe from operating the
casino because it was located off of Indian lands.116
108. Id. at 51-52. Title 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) authorizes a tribe to bring an action
to compel negotiations if the state fails to respond in good faith within 180 days of the
tribe’s request to negotiate.
109. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 76.
110. See id.
111. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2032 (2014); see also
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998) (citing the
provision as an example of federal legislation “restrict[ing] tribal immunity from suit in
limited circumstances”).
112. 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014).
113. Id. at 2029.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2034 (“Everything—literally everything—in IGRA affords tools (for either
state or federal officials) to regulate gaming on Indian lands, and nowhere else.”) (emphasis
added).
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In the absence of express and unequivocal congressional abrogation,117
tribal immunity applies whether a suit is brought by a state,118 or arises
from a tribe's commercial activities off Indian lands.119 Although sovereign
immunity may protect the tribe itself from suit, individuals120 and entities121
engaged in Indian gaming enterprises are often not afforded the same
protections. Individual tribal members are not immune and, unlike state
officers under the IGRA,122 tribal officers are subject to suit for injunctive
relief under the Ex Parte Young doctrine.123
With the foreclosure of IGRA’s enforcement mechanism, the doctrine of
federal preemption developed as a separate and independent defense against
interference at the state level,124 but the preemptive scope of IGRA is not
immediately clear.125

117. Id. at 2027 (referencing C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe
of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001)).
118. Id. (referencing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165
(1977)).
119. Id. (referencing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751
(1988)).
120. Id. at 2035 (“[A]nalogizing to Ex parte Young, tribal immunity does not bar such a
suit for injunctive relief against individuals, including tribal officers, responsible for
unlawful conduct.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
121. See Cook v. AVI Casino Enters., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 725 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he
settled law of our circuit is that tribal corporations acting as an arm of the tribe enjoy the
same sovereign immunity granted to a tribe itself. . . . whether tribal immunity extends to a
tribal business entity depends [on] . . . whether the entity acts as an arm of the tribe so that
its activities are properly deemed to be those of the tribe.”) (citations omitted).
122. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996).
123. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2035 (2014).
124. See, e.g., Great W. Casinos, Inc. v. Morongo Band of Mission Indians, 88 Cal. Rptr.
2d 828, 831 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that state law claims against the tribe, its tribal council,
the individual tribal council members, numerous individual tribal members, counsel for the
tribe, a law firm, and a member of that firm were barred by the separate and independent
grounds of federal preemption and sovereign immunity).
125. For example IGRA’s legislative history suggests that IGRA is “intended to
expressly preempt the field in the governance of gaming activities on Indian lands.” See
Kemper, supra note 101, § 2 (citing S. REP. NO. 100-446 (1988)) (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, § 1166(a) of the United States Code expressly provides that “all State laws
pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including but not limited
to criminal sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in Indian country . . . .” 18 U.S.C. §
1166(a) (2012). Yet a careful reading reveals that approved class III gaming is not subject to
such state laws because approved class III gaming activities are not considered “gambling”
for purposes of the federal statute. Id. § 1166(c).
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In addition, PL 280, enacted before the IGRA, confers broad criminal
jurisdiction to certain states over Indian Country within astate.126 However,
the IGRA maintains that the federal government has “exclusive jurisdiction
over criminal prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws . . . unless
an Indian tribe pursuant to a Tribal-State compact . . . has consented to the
transfer to the State of criminal jurisdiction with respect to gambling on the
lands of the Indian tribe.”127 A majority of authority recognizes that in all
states, including PL 280 states,128 in the absence of a tribal-state compact to
the contrary,129 the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over criminal
prosecutions of violations of state gambling laws that occur on Indian
lands,130 but not for those violations that occur in Indian gaming facilities
located outside of Indian lands.131
Beyond the confounds of the IGRA’s statutory construction, “[i]n
determining whether federal law preempts a state's authority to regulate
gaming activities on tribal lands, different standards apply than in other
areas of federal preemption.”132 Specifically, the IGRA preempts those
disputes and state regulations that threaten or interfere with federal and
tribal interests,133 unless the tribe has consented to state regulation by tribal126. See id. § 1162.
127. Id. § 1166(d).
128. See Lac du Flambeau Band v. Wisconsin, 743 F. Supp. 645, 646 (W.D. Wis. 1990)
(determining that Wisconsin had lost its PL 280 authority to prosecute Indian gambling after
the passage of IGRA).
129. See Wyandotte Nation v. Sebelius, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1273 (D. Kan. 2004)
(“The structure of the IGRA permits assertion of state civil or criminal jurisdiction over
Indian gaming only when a tribal-state compact has been reached to regulate Class III
gaming.”); Lac du Flambeau Band v. Wisconsin, 743 F. Supp. 645, 646 (W.D. Wis. 1990)
(“Unless and until the state negotiates a tribal-state compact in which [the tribe] consents to
the exercise of such jurisdiction, the United States has the exclusive authority to enforce
violations of state gambling laws on plaintiffs' reservations . . . .”).
130. “IGRA limits the state's regulatory authority to that expressly agreed upon in a
compact. Outside the express provisions of a compact, the enforcement of IGRA's
prohibitions on class III gaming remains the exclusive province of the federal government.”
Dewberry v. Kulongoski, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1142 (D. Or. 2005) (citing Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1997)).
131. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1999).
132. 116 AM. JUR. Trials 395 (2010). “Even state law passed in accordance with a state's
police power is held inoperative where it impairs or obstructs the exercise of any power
which the federal government possesses.” 2 J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 36:8 (7th ed. 2007) (citing Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411
U.S. 325 (1973)).
133. 116 AM. JUR. Trials 395; see, e.g., Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 788
F. Supp. 1498, 1504 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (“[A] finding of preemption does not require an
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state compact134 or if the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the
assertion of state authority.135
The IGRA’s statutory language does not expressly prohibit a state’s
power to tax. The trend has been to apply traditional jurisprudence
concerning state taxation of tribal activities and land,136 rather than to apply
the preemption doctrine as a bar to the imposition of all state taxes.137 For
example, when the gaming facility is located on land held in trust, the
gaming related income of tribal members who live within Indian Country is
exempt from state income tax whereas the same income of tribal members
who live outside of Indian Country is not.138 Despite the labyrinth of
caveats and ambiguities, the states continue to stand to benefit from the
exercise of taxing power over gaming operations. In particular “income
earned by employees living off the reservation, money or prizes won by
non-reservation residents, and goods and services provided by non-tribal
vendors” remain subject to state taxation.139
Nevertheless, “[a]lthough some states welcome the economic boost that
Indian gaming provides, there has also been a considerable backlash to its
development.”140 “States over-whelmingly [sic] attempt to mitigate this

express statement of congressional intent to preempt. A federal statute will be preemptive if
the ‘state law conflicts with the purpose or operation of a federal statute’ . . . the IGRA
creates a comprehensive jurisdictional framework for the regulation of gaming activities on
Indian lands. The regulation of gaming by states outside the framework of the IGRA would
frustrate this framework and Congress's careful balancing of the competing interests
involved in Indian gaming.”) (internal citations omitted)).
134. Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 545 (8th Cir. 1996)
(“Congress did not intend to transfer any jurisdictional or regulatory power to the states by
means of IGRA unless a tribe consented to such a transfer in a tribal-state compact.”)
135. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983) (“State
jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible
with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake are
sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority.”); Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v.
Wilson, 37 F.3d 430, 433 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,
462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983)).
136. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing Indian tax immunity).
137. See Kemper, supra note 101, §§ 17-18.
138. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973); accord
Tunica-Biloxi Tribe v. Louisiana, 964 F.2d 1536 (5th Cir. 1992); accord Dark-Eyes v.
Comm’r of Revenue Servs., 887 A.2d 848 (Conn. 2006).
139. Alan P. Meister et al., Indian Gaming and Beyond: Tribal Economic Development
and Diversification, 54 S.D. L. REV. 375, 397 (2009).
140. Matthew Murphy, Betting the Rancheria: Environmental Protections as Bargaining
Chips Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 171, 173
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backlash by demanding large revenue-sharing agreements in the tribal-state
compacting process.”141 “Under such an arrangement, a tribe hands over to
the state a fixed sum or a percentage of its gaming revenues. . . it is
estimated that the Seminole Tribe, for example, produces over $1 billion in
gaming revenues annually, $100 million of which it now shares with the
State of Florida under those parties' January 2008 compact.”142

Indian gaming has facilitated the improvement of economic
conditions for many tribes,143 however, the legislative gaps in IGRA

have rendered it, and consequently its beneficial impact, susceptible to
butchery by the courts. In addition to permitting the imposition of state
regulation and taxation under certain and somewhat ambiguous
circumstances, IGRA’s abrogation of tribal sovereignty in contrast to the
strength of state Eleventh Amendement immunity creates a grievous
inbalance of bargaining power.
This imbalance became notably evident after the Seminole decision
rendered IGRA’s compulsory tribal-state compacting provision moot. As a
practical matter, revenue-sharing agreements became the sole “mechanism
by which tribes [could] induce states to conclude class III gaming
compacts,”144 forcing many tribes to choose between forfeiting a portion of
gaming revenue to the state or forgoing highly profitable gaming operations
altogether.
B. Indian Tobacco
Traditionally, Native Americans managed to profit from the sale of
tobacco products because, as dependent nations who enjoy sovereign
immunity, “[s]tate sales taxes [were generally] not applicable on Indian
reservations, and many smokers [went] to them in order to buy cigarettes

(2009) (citing Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 39, 69 (2007)).
141. Id.
142. Courtney J. A. DaCosta, When "Turnabout" Is Not "Fair Play": Tribal Immunity
Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 97 GEO. L.J. 515, 543 (2009) (citing Notice of
Deemed Approved Tribal-State Class III Gaming Compact, 73 Fed. Reg. 1229, 1229 (Jan. 7,
2008); John Holland, Gambling Compact Challenged: House Speaker Asks Court To Block
Seminoles Deal, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov. 20, 2007, at 1A).
143. For example “[o]ne recent study found that between 1990 and 2000, the presence of
a tribal casino increased average per capita income by 7.4%.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
144. Courtney J. A. DaCosta, Note, When “Turnabout” Is Not “Fair Play”: Tribal
Immunity Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 97 GEO. L.J. 515, 543 (2009).
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and other products at a discount.”145 However, a sordid history of federal
legislation and Supreme Court jurisprudence has chipped away at the scope
of the tribal exemption from state tax.146 In addition, state legislation
enacted in many states to “more stringently regulate the sale of tobacco
products” has worked to decrease the profitability of Indian tobacco
sales.147
Although Congress has not expressly abrogated tribal sovereign
immunity from state taxation of tobacco, it has demonstrated intent to
forestall tribal circumvention of state tobacco taxes. Under the “Prevent All
Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009” (PACT Act), all Indian tobacco
businesses must comply with reporting requirements to state tax
administrators, regulations of shipments of cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco, and state stamping (taxation) requirements.148 Noncompliant
Indian vendors are subject to both civil and criminal penalties under the
federal enforcement statute.149
In addition, the tribal tobacco market is complicated by the passage of
the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), a settlement agreement entered
into between forty-six states (as well as the District of Columbia and five
U.S. territories) and several major domestic tobacco companies resolving
litigation over the health problems caused by tobacco.150 The MSA requires
tobacco companies to pay approximately $10 billion per year to the settling

145. Shihoko Goto, American Indians Fear Tobacco Tax Fixes May Hurt Them,
CONGRESSDAILY, May 1, 2008, at 16.
146. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2043 (2014) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring).
147. Patricia Molteni, Regulating Tribal Cigarette Sales Under the Master Settlement
Agreement, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN. GAZETTE (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.naag.
org/publications/naagazette/volume-6-number-1/regulating-tribal-cigarette-sales-under-themaster-settlement-agreement.php.
148. Kathryn A. Mayer, Negotiating Past The Zero-Sum Of Intractable Sovereignty
Positions by Exploring the Potential of Possible Party Interests: A Proposed Dispute
Resolution Framework for the Tobacco Tax Debacle Between the State Of New York & the
Seneca Nation of Indians, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 771, 803 (2013).
149. Id.
150. See Master Settlement Agreement, PUB. HEALTH L. CENTER, http://publichealth
lawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/master-settlement-agreement.pdf (last visited Oct.
1, 2014). The four tobacco companies, frequently referred to as Participating Manufacturers
(“PMs”) or Original Participating Manufacturers (“OPMs”) in the context of the MSA and
related state legislation, and “the majors” in the context of case law, include Philip Morris,
Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. and Lorillard
Tobacco Company. Molteni, supra note 147.
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states151 and substantially restricts future tobacco marketing, but it also
ensures the tobacco market is foreclosed to competitors who did not enter
the MSA.152 In effect, the MSA ultimately requires all tobacco
manufacturers “selling cigarettes to consumers within the [settling] state,
whether directly or through a distributor, retailer or similar intermediary or
intermediaries,” to pay a specified dollar amount per unit sold for the
benefit of that state.153
In addition, most of the settling states have enacted additional
complementary legislation or regulation in order to prevent tobacco
companies who have not agreed to follow the MSA from selling their
products within the state.154 Oklahoma, for example, publishes and
maintains the Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and
Brand Families (Directory), which lists the tobacco product manufacturers
that have been certified by the state as compliant with Oklahoma tobacco
laws.155 In order to enforce the payment requirements, Oklahoma legislation
prohibits the sale or possession of tobacco products made by entities not
listed in the Directory.156 In order to “avoid having their products deemed
‘contraband,’” which is subject to seizure by the state (and may entitle the
settling state to any gross proceeds realized from the sale of contraband
tobacco products), tribes can only sell tobacco products made by
manufacturers listed in the state’s Directory.157
151.
152.
153.
154.

Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 150.
Id.
37 OKLA. STAT. § 600.23 (2011).
As the Second Circuit observed:
After enactment of the Escrow Statutes, New York and the other states passed
“Contraband Statutes,” or “Certification Statutes,” to help ensure compliance
with the Escrow Statutes. These laws require cigarette manufacturers, other
than OPMs [Original Participating Manufacturers], that sell products in a state
to certify annually to the state attorney general that they are either (1) meeting
their obligation as an SPM [Subsequent Participating Manufacturer] under the
MSA or (2) making escrow deposits as an NPM.
Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2005).
155. Molteni, supra note 147.
156. Id.; see also 68 OKLA. STAT. § 360.4(C) (2011); id. § 360.8(G).
157. Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2012). I this case the
plaintiff, as a tribal tobacco retailer, was not directly regulated as a “tobacco product
manufacturer” in Oklahoma, and the Tenth Circuit “rejected the tribe's argument that
government seizure of unstamped cigarettes outside Indian territory affects the tribe as it
restricts the brands of cigarettes tribal members can buy inside the territory.” 10th Circuit
Rejects Oklahoma Tribe’s Challenge to Tobacco Laws, WESTLAW J. TOBACCO INDUSTRY,
Mar. 23, 2012, 27 No. 14 WJTOB 7 (Westlaw).
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Although the contours of Indian sovereign immunity from state taxation
are not perfectly clear, the argument that tribal sovereign immunity
insulates Indian tobacco from state regulation has been all but foreclosed, if
only because its protection is limited to circumstances that, for most tribes,
are not economically feasible. “The modern-day jurisdictional framework
housing the dispute over state taxation of [tribal] tobacco sales to nonIndians on reservation land reflects both a controversy over competing
claims of Indian sovereignty, and state complaints of unfair competition
that are entrenched in both politics and economics.”158 As a result, the
judicial dissemination of tribal sovereign immunity protection from state
taxation and regulation has been more or less consistent while still
maintaining enough fact-specific ambiguity to keep state and tribal interests
wrestling in court.159
The Supreme Court maintains a “unique Indian tax immunity
jurisprudence,”160 which rests on two pertinent principles: first, “[a]bsent
express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation
boundaries have generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state law
otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State”;161 and second, a state may
“impose a nondiscriminatory tax on non-Indian customers of Indian
retailers doing business on the reservation,”162 unless the tribe actually
bears the incidence of the tax.163 Slowly chipping away at the traditional
understanding of tribal immunity from state taxation, the Supreme Court
has held that states may collect taxes on: sales to non-Indians on Indian
Land;164 companies owned by non-Indians on Indian Land;165 property
owned by non-Indians on Indian Land;166 and allotment lands.167
158. Mayer, supra note 148, at 803.
159. See generally Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S.
61, 73 (1994) (“Resolution of conflicts of this kind does not depend on ‘rigid rule[s]’ or on
‘mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty,’ but instead on ‘a
particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an
inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority
would violate federal law.”) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.
136, 142, 145 (1980)); see also Mayer, supra note 148, at 803-05.
160. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 112 (2005).
161. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1973).
162. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
151 (1980).
163. Id.; see also Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Wagnon v.
Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 101 (2005).
164. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2043 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (referencing Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of
Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991)).
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An illustrative example of jurisprudence regarding the relationship of
tribes and taxes lies in the recent King Mountain Tobacco litigation. King
Mountain Tobacco Company is owned and operated by an enrolled member
of the Yakima reservation, and located on trust lands within the Yakima
reservation.168 The Yakima Nation contended that their tobacco products
were exempt from both a Washington state escrow statute169 and federal
excise taxes.170 During processing, King Mountain ships its tobacco to
Tennessee, and then to North Carolina where it is blended with tobacco
grown off-reservation. The tobacco is sent back to the reservation for final
processing before it is distributed for sale throughout Washington and in
about sixteen other states.171
In King Mountain Tobacco Co. v. McKenna,172 the district court found
that King Mountain's “operations involve[d] extensive off-reservation
activity,” and that “the tobacco products produced by King Mountain
[were] not principally generated from the use of reservation land and
resources.”173 In light of these factual findings, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
district court’s ruling that Washington’s non-discriminatory state escrow
statute was fully enforceable against the company just as a state sales tax on
the tobacco would have been.174 On the other hand, in King Mountain
Tobacco Co. v. Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau (2013), the district
court found that the trust-land grown tobacco was not itself subject to a
federal excise tax.175 In fact, if the tobacco had simply been grown on

165. Id. (referencing Arizona Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32
(1999)).
166. Id. (referencing Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898)).
167. Id. (referencing Cass Cnty. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103
(1998); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251
(1992)). Allotment lands are reservation land that Congress has authorized individuals to
hold in fee when made subject to sale under the General Allotment Act of 1887. Id.
168. King Mt. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau, 996 F.
Supp. 2d 1061, 1062 (E.D. Wash. 2014) (finding the lands held in trust under IRA).
169. King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc. v. McKenna, 768 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2014).
170. King Mt. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau, 923 F.
Supp. 2d 1280 (E.D. Wash. 2013); King Mt. Tobacco Co., 996 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
171. McKenna, 768 F.3d at 994 (quoting King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc. v. McKenna,
No. CV-11-3018-LRS, 2013 WL 1403342 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 2013)).
172. 768 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2014).
173. Id. at 992 (internal citations omitted).
174. Id. at 996-97.
175. 923 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1283 (E.D. Wash. 2013).
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reservation lands and then sold, “those sales, and the income derived
therefrom, would be tax free.”176
The possibility of future litigation in favor of meaningful tribal immunity
from state tax seems unlikely. Moreover, under the current framework,
sovereign immunity from state tax would be applicable only where: (1)
federal law expressly exempts a tribe from state taxation;177 (2) the state has
exempted a particular tribe from state tax by statute, regulation, or
contract;178 or (3) a company is wholly owned by a single federally
recognized tribe,179 produces, manufactures and conducts sales180 (only to
members of the same tribe)181 exclusively on property that is owned wholly
by the tribe and located on reservation land.182 As a result, many states have
taken advantage of the tribe’s disadvantaged position, commonly
renegotiating tobacco compacts and raising tax rates,183 effectively
176. Id. at 1284.
177. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1973); Wagnon v. Prairie
Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 113 (2005) (quoting Mescalero).
178. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 82.24.020 (West 2010) (providing that the terms
of a contract between the state and tribe take precedence over any conflicting statutory
provisions regarding restricted tribal exemption from state tax on the “sale, use,
consumption, handling, possession or distribution of all cigarettes”).
179. See Edmondson v. Native Wholesale Supply, 2010 OK 58, 237 P.3d 199, 210
(holding that sovereign immunity does not automatically extend to “every business that
happens to be tribally chartered or owned by individuals of Native-American ancestry,” but
rather the entity must “act[] as an arm of the tribe so that its activities are properly deemed to
be those of the tribe”); see also King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc. v. McKenna, No. CV-113018-LRS, 2013 WL 1403342 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 2013), aff’d, 768 F.3d 989 (9th Cir.
2014).
180. King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc. v. McKenna, 768 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2014).
181. See Edmondson, 2010 OK 58, 237 P.3d at 215 (“When [tribal cigarette commerce]
occurs off the reservation or among more than one tribe, this conduct is generally subject to
all non-discriminatory state laws so long as they are not expressly prohibited by federal
law.”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 82.24.020 (exempting from state taxes cigarette sales
from federally recognized tribal organizations to members of their own tribe under the
jurisdiction of their own tribe for their own use).
182. See, e.g., Edmondson, 2010 OK 58, 237 P.3d at 215. The General Allotment Act
and later amendments worked to exempt the following tribes from the imposition of state
civil jurisdiction, including imposition of state taxes: Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw,
Chickasaw, Seminole Osage, Sac and Fox, in the Oklahoma Territory, any of the
reservations of the Seneca Nation of New York, and a strip of territory in the State of
Nebraska adjoining the Sioux Nation. See 25 U.S.C. § 340 (2012); 25 U.S.C. § 339 (2012).
183. In Oklahoma, for example:
Oklahoma officials are pushing to raise taxes on tribal tobacco sales to a level
that would reduce or wipe out the competitive price advantage tribal smoke
shops have enjoyed for decades. . . Gov. Mary Fallin’s general council . . . said
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foreclosing the possibility of a tribal economic advantage over non-tribal
tobacco retailers in the state.
C. Hemp Production: Pine Ridge and the White Plume Controversy
More recently, tribes have considered hemp production as an alternative
to the tobacco market. Unlike tobacco, which “wears out the land,
exhausting minerals and nutrients from the soil,”184 hemp actually improves
the soil in which it is grown.185 In addition, industrial hemp cultivation
requires virtually no pesticides and minimal fertilizer to grow successfully
in many different soils and climates and provides abundant alternative
sources for the production of paper, clothing and fossil fuels.186
The Pine Ridge Reservation, home of the Oglala Sioux in South Dakota,
encompasses the entirety of Shannon County,187 “the poorest county in
America.”188 As of 2002, “[f]orty percent of reservation housing [was]
listed as substandard, and one-fifth of the homes [did] not have indoor
plumbing or telephone services.”189 Only 84,000 acres of the 2.1 million
acres of reservation land are suitable for agriculture.190
The CSA makes it illegal to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess
hemp191 without a “DEA Certificate of Registration” (DEA registration).192

the main goal of negotiations with tribes over new tobacco compacts is not to
improve health outcomes, but to make tobacco taxes more consistent in the
state.
Clifton Adcock, Oklahoma Pushes to Boost Taxes on Tribal Tobacco Sales, NEWSOK (July
5, 2013), http://newsok.com/oklahoma-pushes-to-boost-taxes-on-tribal-tobacco-sales/article/
3859155.
184. Charles A. Grymes, Tobacco in Virginia, VIRGINIA PLACES, http://www.virginia
places.org/agriculture/tobacco.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
185. See Lash, supra note 43, at 335-37.
186. See id.
187. Pine Ridge Indian Reservation – Civic Life and History, BLACK HILLS KNOWLEDGE
NETWORK, http://blackhillsknowledgenetwork.org/pine-ridge/pine-ridge-civic-life-and-history
(last visited Aug. 24, 2015).
188. Lash, supra note 43, at 334 (citing Pine Ridge Reservation, HECEL OYAKAPI,
https://web.archive.org/web/20010218003320/http://lakotastory.org/pineridge.html
(last
visited Aug. 24, 2015)).
189. Id.
190. See Pine Ridge Indian Reservation – Civic Life and History, supra note 187.
191. The Act defines marijuana as “all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether
growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or
resin.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2012).
192. United States v. White Plume, 447 F.3d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 2006).
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The CSA’s registration requirements193 and penalties194 apply to “any
person,” including tribal members.195 Even so, in 1998, the Oglala Sioux
Tribe passed an ordinance to amend the Tribal Penal Code to specifically
exclude industrial hemp from the definition of marijuana.
In 2000, Alex White Plume, a member of the Lakota nation196 who
believed that the tribe retained the right to cultivate hemp under the Treaty
of Fort Laramie (Treaty),197 ceremonially planted his first crop of industrial
hemp on 1.5 acres198 of federal trust land199 with wild seeds found on Pine
Ridge on the 132nd anniversary of the signing of the Treaty.200 Although
Alex White Plume announced the planting of his crop on the local
reservation radio and invited representatives from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) and State Attorney’s office to attend the ceremony,201 he did
not apply for a DEA registration.202 After Alex White Plume contracted to
sell the crop, the U.S. government “obtained samples of it under a search
warrant, and, pursuant to court order, destroyed it.”203
In 2001, Percy White Plume likewise planted a crop of hemp on federal
trust land without a DEA registration, and again the government destroyed
the crop.204 In 2002, Alex White Plume planted another crop of industrial
hemp, prompting “the government [to] ask[] the district court to declare
193. See 21 U.S.C. § 822(a)(1) (“Every person who manufactures or distributes any
controlled substance or list I chemical, or who proposes to engage in the manufacture or
distribution of any controlled substance or list I chemical, shall obtain annually a registration
issued by the Attorney General in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by
him.”).
194. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally—(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance . . . .”).
195. See United States v. Native Wholesale Supply Co., 822 F. Supp. 2d 326, 337
(W.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing United States. v. White, 237 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2001)); Lash,
supra note 43, at 344.
196. See Lash, supra note 43, at 337 (quoting Alex White Plume, Lakota).
197. See White Plume, 447 F.3d at 1074.
198. Lash, supra note 43, at 340.
199. See White Plume, 447 F.3d at 1069.
200. Lash, supra note 43, at 340.
201. See id. at 340-41 (explaining that White Plume was celebrating the 132nd
anniversary of the signing of the Fort Laramie Treaty which he believed granted the tribe the
right to cultivate hemp).
202. White Plume, 447 F.3d at 1069.
203. Id. But see Lash, supra note 43, at 341 (asserting that the lab test revealed that the
plants contained no detectable quantity of THC).
204. See White Plume, 447 F.3d at 1069-70.
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them [the White Plumes] in violation of the [CSA] and permanently enjoin
them from manufacturing or distributing cannabis.”205 After finding that the
White Plumes violated the CSA by growing hemp, a type of marijuana, and
that no treaty right to grow hemp existed, the district court granted the
government summary judgment and ordered the White Plumes
“permanently enjoined from cultivating Cannabis sativa L. without a valid
DEA registration.”206 In United States v. White Plume,207 the Eighth Circuit
affirmed, stating:
We are not unmindful of the challenges faced by members of the
Tribe to engage in sustainable farming on federal trust lands. It
may be that the growing of hemp for industrial uses is the most
viable agricultural commodity for that region. And we do not
doubt that there are a countless number of beneficial products
which utilize hemp in some fashion. Nor do we ignore the
burdens imposed by a DEA registration necessary to grow hemp
legally, such as the security measures required by the
regulations . . . . But these are policy arguments better suited for
the congressional hearing room than the courtroom. Today we
fulfill our role to interpret and apply the statute as written by
Congress, and affirm the district court.208
Although Indian gaming, Indian tobacco and tribal hemp production do not
provide a complete framework that is perfectly analogous to Indian
marijuana, the legal issues raised by tribal involvement in these commercial
activitites provide a useful context for a potential tribal marijuana market.
III. Proposed Federal Legislation: A Pro-Marijuana Policy Statement?
In addition to the marijuana policy implicit in the Consolidated Further
and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015,209 several pieces of proposed
legislation suggest that Congress has finally heard the cry of public opinion
in favor of legalizing marijuana.210

205. Id. at 1070.
206. Id.
207. 447 F.3d 1067.
208. Id. at 1076.
209. See discussion supra Part I.C.
210. “[F]or the first time, a clear majority of Americans (58%) say the drug should be
legalized. This is in sharp contrast to the time Gallup first asked the question in 1969, when
only 12% favored legalization.” Art Swift, For First Time, Americans Favor Legalizing
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On February 5, 2013, the “Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of
2013” was proposed in the House of Representatives.211 The bill seeks to
“decriminalize marijuana at the Federal level, to leave to the States a power
to regulate marijuana that is similar to the power they have to regulate
alcohol.”212 The bill specifies that the term “state” includes territories and
possessions of the United States.213 Under the Act, which was referred to
the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, And
Investigations in February of 2013, “[i]t shall be unlawful, except pursuant
to a [federal] permit . . . to engage in the business of cultivating, producing,
manufacturing, packaging, or warehousing marijuana.”214 The bill further
makes it unlawful to transport marijuana from a state where it is legal to
another state which still prohibits marijuana.215 However penalties for the
import of marijuana into a state where marijuana remains illegal are
expressly provided within the proposed federal law, and include a fine
and/or imprisonment for less than one year.216 In addition, import,
production, manufacture and sale of marijuana is unlawful “except pursuant
to a permit issued . . . by the Secretary of the Treasury.”217
On the very same day, the “Marijuana Tax Equity Act of 2013” hit the
House floor, setting forth to “amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to
provide for the taxation of marijuana.”218 The proposed act imposes a tax on
producers and importers of marijuana of 50% of the sales price of
marijuana.219 Pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary, no tax
shall be imposed on the sale by the producer or importer unless the
purchaser is a retailer, distributor, or consumer.220 In other words, a
Marijuana, GALLUP (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165539/first-timeamericans-favor-legalizing-marijuana.aspx.
211. H.R. 499 – Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/499/text (last visited Aug. 24,
2015).
212. Id. at pmbl. (emphasis added).
213. Id. sec. 201, § 303.
214. Id. sec. 201, § 301.
215. Id. sec. 201, § 302.
216. Id. sec. 102, § 103.
217. Id. sec. 201, § 301.
218. H.R. 501 – Marijuana Tax Equity Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/501/text (last visited Aug. 24, 2015).
219. Id. sec. 2, § 5901.
220. See id. sec. 2, § 5902. In pertinent part section 5902(a) reads:
(a) General Rule. Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, no tax shall
be imposed under this subchapter on the sale by the producer or importer of an
article-
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producer is not liable for the 50% excise tax if the purchaser intends to
export, produce, or resale the product for the purposes of export or
production. The proposed tax act does not define “exporter,” but this term
likely includes those who ship marijuana to a possession of the United
States.221 An “importer” is a person in the United States who receives nontax-paid marijuana or marijuana products shipped from a foreign country or
U.S. territory.222
Still further, the Industrial Hemp Farming Act of 2013 was introduced in
the House on February 6, 2013, seeking to amend section 102 of the CSA
by excluding hemp from the definition of marijuana.223 This provision
legalizes the production, possession and sale of a particular species of
cannabis that is not psychoactive.224 Because of environmental and
economic benefits, many states, including South Dakota, are considering
legalizing hemp.225
IV. Legal Analysis: Tribal Involvement in the Marijuana Industry Under the
CSA and Proposed Legislation
The status quo, namely a federal prohibition of marijuana in
juxtaposition to an administration permitting states and tribes to legalize
marijuana, offsets the stage for conflict between states and tribes regardless
of whether they are for or against marijuana legalization. For example, both
states and Indian nations that are opposed to marijuana legalization will
find that their ability to prohibit marijuana from entering their community is
ultimately hindered by the double-edged doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Concerning Native Americans, in the absence of federal decriminalization
and regulation that permits a concerted national enforcement strategy, tribes
that are harmed by the diversion of marijuana products onto their lands will
(1) for use by the purchaser for further production, or for resale by the
purchaser to a second purchaser for use by such second purchaser in further
production, or
(2) for export, or for resale by the purchaser to a second purchaser for
export.
Id. However, § 5902(f) provides: “For purposes of this chapter, a producer to whom
an article is sold or resold free of tax under subsection (a)(1) for use by him in further
production shall be treated as the producer of such article.” Id.
221. Id. (emphasis added).
222. Id. sec. 2, § 5904.
223. S. 359 – Industrial Hemp Farming Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/359/text (last visited Aug. 24, 2015).
224. See id.
225. Hopkins, supra note 52.
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continue to suffer without a means of redress because the states retain
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.226 Concerning the states, the
DOJ’s announcement that the federal government will not prosecute Native
Americans growing and selling marijuana on tribal lands has been
commonly understood to mean that it “will not prosecute Native Americans
who grow and sell marijuana on tribal lands, even in states where the drug
is illegal.”227 Because a state’s interest in preventing marijuana production
on tribal lands will likely be insufficient to overcome tribal immunity from
state regulation,228 if Congress has any interest in preventing tribes from
engaging in the marijuana industry in states where marijuana remains
prohibited, it must expressly abrogate such tribal immunity.
Despite the potential conflicts between communities that stand on
opposing sides of the marijuana-legalization debate, it is evident that many
states have considered the potential cost of litigation to be minimal when
compared to the potential of marijuana related revenue.229 “Like the gaming
industry, the cannabis industry has the potential to provide Native
Americans with more jobs, capital, and sovereignty.”230 So why have tribes
not followed the example of the states, ignore the CSA, decriminalize and
tax marijuana, and perhaps even grow marijuana? The answer is simple.
The ambiguity and confusion in American Indian law coupled with the
unpredictability and uncertainty of marijuana law231 creates a singular
inevitability: a real and substantial risk.
For example, while those private businesses in the marijuana industry
risk finding themselves unable to enforce marijuana related business

226. See discussion supra Part I.A (discussing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida).
Unlike Oklahoma and Nebraska, tribes affected by diversion cannot sustain an action against
a state that asserts Eleventh Amendment immunity. Compare Colorado v. New Mexico, 459
U.S. 176, 182 n.9 (1982) (disregarding claim of state immunity from suit because the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against a state by another state that has a substantial
interest in the outcome of the suit), with Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against a state by Native
American Tribes). See also supra Part I.E. for a discussion of the recent marijuana diversion
suit brought by Oklahoma and Nebraska against Colorado.
227. Amanda Lewis, Why Did the Feds Just Legalize Cannabis on Native American
Lands?, LA WEEKLY (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.laweekly.com/music/why-did-the-fedsjust-legalize-cannabis-on-native-american-lands-5290569.
228. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
229. See discussion supra Part I.B.
230. Native American Tribes Consider Legalizing Marijuana, VIRDIS LAW GROUP (July
17, 2014), http://viridislawgroup.com/native-american-tribes-consider-legalizing-marijuana/.
231. See discussion supra Part I.E.
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agreements,232 if a tribe were a party to a marijuana related tribal-state
compact lacking waivers of sovereign immunity, both tribal and state
sovereign immunity would stand as an additional hurdle to contract
enforcement and serve as yet another deterrent to tribal-state compacting
and government-to-government cooperation.233
Nevertheless, Congress’ first attempts to decriminalize and tax marijuana
do little to solve the problem of legal confusion for Native Americans. The
proposed federal legislation seeks to amend both the CSA and the IRS
code, both of which are statutes of general applicability that apply to Native
Americans.234 Under the current proposed legislation, the lack of any
Congressional reference to the acts’ intended application in Indian Country,
specifically the intended civil regulatory and criminal prohibitory
relationship between the tribes and the states, creates a new problem for the
courts to attempt to solve.
A. Is the Preemptive Effect of the CSA Enough to Protect the White Plumes
and Others if the CSA Is Amended to Exclude Industrial Hemp from the
Definition of Marijuana?
As a general matter, the questions of choice of law and criminal
jurisdiction elicit imprecise answers in the context of Indian law because
American Indian law is the confluence of and interaction between the
policy, statutory law, and common law of three different overlapping
sovereigns: the federal government, the states, and the tribes. Because the
Supreme Court has yet to specifically weigh in whether or not the CSA
preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause,235 additional uncertainties
have arisen now that new questions concerning the legality of marijuana on
reservation land that is located in a state that is implementing its own
marijuana policy that is itself located within a country where marijuana is
illegal pursuant to a federal statute that remains unenforced due to federal
policy considerations. Although the Supremacy Clause question has been
raised in pending litigation,236 Congress may enact proposed marijuana
legislation before an opinion is rendered. Proposed legislation to remove
industrial hemp from the definition of marijuana under the CSA is likely to

232. Id.
233. See discussion supra Parts I.A, E.
234. See supra note 43.
235. See discussion supra Part I.A.
236. See discussion supra Part I.E. (discussing Nebraska & Oklahoma v. Colorado, No.
144 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2014)).
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be the first step towards federal decriminalization because it comprises the
least ambitious piece of pro-marijuana legislation on the floor.
Although in theory this amendment to the CSA will finally give power to
the Oglala Sioux tribal ordinance that likewise excludes industrial hemp
from the definition of marijuana,237 the possession, and therefore the
production and sale, of “all parts of any plant of the genus cannabis”238
remains criminally proscribed under the laws of South Dakota.239 Even
though the possession of hemp fiber, oil, or cake made from hemp seeds is
not prohibited under the laws of South Dakota,240 and South Dakota does
not exercise criminal jurisdiction on Indian lands because it is not a PL 280
state,241 any unaltered hemp transported to or from the Pine Ridge
reservation will remain subject state criminal sanctions and confiscation
unless South Dakota amends its criminal code242 or the U.S. Supreme Court
holds that the CSA preempts state law.243
B. Are Domestic Dependent Nations “Territories or Possessions of the
United States”?
Proposed legislation to tax marijuana applies to producers or importers
engaged in retail or distribution, but provides an importer or producer tax
exemption from the 50% federal excise tax.244 If federally recognized tribes,
as sovereign nations are deemed to fall outside of the definition of “territory
or possession of the United States,” they may be able to use the exporter
status to gain an economic advantage over businesses within the states.
However, while “Congress has unambiguously intended for the word
‘person,’ as used in the Internal Revenue Code, to encompass all legal
entities, including Indian tribes and tribal organizations, that are the subject
of rights and duties,”245 there is no clear case law determining whether
tribes are considered a possession or territory of the United States.246
237. See Oglala Sioux Tribal Council Ordinance No. 98-27 (July 28, 1998), available at
https://www.votehemp.com/PDF/OrdinanceNo9827.pdf.
238. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-42-1 (2015).
239. See, e.g., id. § 22-42-6 (“No person may knowingly possess marijuana.”).
240. Id. § 22-42-1.
241. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012).
242. South Dakota has considered legalizing industrial hemp. See Hopkins, supra note
52.
243. See discussion supra Parts I.A, E.
244. See discussion supra Part III.
245. 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indians; Native Americans § 36 (2010).
246. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Because Indian
nations are not referenced in the statute, the question is whether tribes are ‘territories or
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Despite the fact that nearly all federal environmental laws expressly treat
tribes as states,247 the current bills leave much unresolved for Native
Americans. Specifically, whether or not the tribes will be treated as states
and permitted to independently regulate marijuana in Indian Country, and
whether or not the tribes can take advantage of the importer-producer
excise tax exemption, remains unclear.
C. What Is “A Power to Regulate Marijuana That Is Similar to the Power
States Have to Regulate Alcohol”?
The bill to end federal prohibition of marijuana, leaving to the states the
power to regulate marijuana like they currently regulate alcohol,248 prohibits
the import of marijuana into a state where marijuana remains illegal,
penalizes such violations under federal law,249 and provides that the
Secretary of the Treasury will not permit a marijuana business in a state
where such business is unlawful.250 As domestic dependent nations, federal
law is clear that tribal lands are subject to the jurisdiction of the United
possessions’ of the United States under the statute. . . . [I]n United States ex rel. Mackey v.
Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 103-04, 15 L.Ed. 299 (1855), the Court held the Cherokee
nation was a territory as that term was used in a federal letters of administration statute. By
contrast, in New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468, 474-75, 29 S.Ct. 190, 191-92,
53 L.Ed. 286 (1909), the Court cited with approval Ex Parte Morgan, 20 F. 298, 305
(W.D.Ark.1883) in which the district court held that the Cherokee nation was not a
‘territory’ under the federal extradition statute. State courts have reached varied results,
citing either Mackey or Morgan as authority, depending on the outcome.” (citations
omitted)); Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier & Anne W. Bishop, The Three-Billion-Dollar
Question, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 323, 344 (2009); see also United States v. White, 237 F.3d 170,
173 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It is well settled that American Indian reservations have been
‘incorporat[ed] within the territory of the United States,’ United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978), and thus are not foreign territory, see
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 165,
100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(‘While they are sovereign for some purposes, it is now clear that Indian reservations do not
partake of the full territorial sovereignty of States or foreign countries.’)); United States v.
Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 847 (8th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1050, 119 S.Ct. 1355, 143
L.Ed.2d 517 (1999); (‘[T]ribal governments are dependent sovereigns-not independent
foreign ones.’); White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 547 (D.S.D.1977) (‘The Indian tribes
have vestiges of sovereignty which must be guarded carefully, but reservations are not
analogous to foreign states.’), aff'd, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir.1978).”).
247. Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law: Models for Expanded
Usage, 112 HARV. L. REV. 922, 924-35 (1999).
248. See discussion supra Part III.
249. See discussion supra Part III.
250. See H.R. 499 – Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, supra note 211.
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States.251 But without clear case law on whether or not domestic dependent
nations are territories or possessions of the United States, one must ask:
under this Act will tribes, states, and/or the federal government retain
jurisdiction over criminal marijuana offenses on Indian land? Further, will
this legislation preempt the enforcement of state criminal law in the same
manner as IGRA?252
“[I]n theory, if the federal government truly respected the rights and will
of our nation’s original inhabitants, it would respect tribal nations’ choice to
legalize [or prohibit] marijuana.”253 Without an express statement that tribes
are to be treated as states under proposed legislation, the prospect of
authoritative tribal marijuana law remains tenuous at best. At present, the
federal government exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate liquor on
Indian lands.254 States regulate liquor sales on tribal land under a federal
statute that permits liquor sales in Indian Country but only “in conformity
both with the laws of the State . . . and with an ordinance duly adopted by
the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country.”255 Moreover,
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that tribes have no inherent power to
regulate liquor because of their status as domestic dependent nations.256

251. See discussion supra Part I.D.
252. See discussion supra Part II.A.
253. Native American Tribes Consider Legalizing Marijuana, VIRIDIS LAW GROUP (July
17, 2014), http://viridislawgroup.com/native-american-tribes-consider-legalizing-marijuana/.
254. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Mazurie:
Article I, § 8, of the Constitution gives Congress power “(t)o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.” This Court has repeatedly held that this clause affords Congress
the power to prohibit or regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages to tribal
Indians, wherever situated, and to prohibit or regulate the introduction of
alcoholic beverages into Indian country.
419 U.S. 544, 555 (1975) (citing United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 417-18
(1866); United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 194-95 (1876); Ex
parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663, 683-84 (1912); Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, 482
(1914); Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1914); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S.
591, 597 (1916)).
255. See 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2012).
256. Thomas H. Oehmke with Joan M. Brovins, Business Activities on Reservation—
Tribal Taxation—Liquor Control, in 2 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §
40:112 (citing Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 726 (1983)).
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D. Economic Feasibility Hinges on Tax Exemption: What Is the Best Way
to Balance State, Federal and Tribal Interests?
In light of the illustrative model of Indian tobacco, under the currently
proposed statutory framework of federally legalized and taxed marijuana,
the only feasible means for the tribes to profit from the marijuana industry
would be through the avoidance of state and/or federal taxes.257 Without
express congressional intent to exempt tribes from the proposed, and
crippling, 50% federal tax258 on top of state taxes,259 the realization of tribal
self-sufficiency through marijuana revenues is achievable only in specific
circumstances. First, under a revival of the vanishing doctrine of sovereign
immunity from non-discriminatory state taxes, tribes may achieve selfsufficiency.260 Second, if tribes and tribal organizations are not considered a
“possession” of the United States, they can increase the demand for
marijuana produced, manufactured, or resold for production on Indian lands
with the bargaining power of the proposed importer tax exemption.261
Third, if tribes produce marijuana on tribal land and sell it to a purchaser
for the purpose of production or export by that purchaser, the transaction
would be exempt from the proposed federal excise tax.262 Fourth, through
the production of marijuana exclusively on trust lands,263 which are exempt
from state and local taxes, as well as federal income taxes under the U.S.
Supreme Court’s holding in Capoeman, tribes could bypass federal and

257. See text accompanying supra note 79 and discussion supra Part II.B.
258. See 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indians; Native Americans § 36 (2010) (“Indians, like all other
citizens, are subject to federal income tax, unless some provision of a statute or treaty
expressly and specifically confers an exemption.”).
259. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 72 (discussing Colorado’s marijuana excise tax).
260. See text accompanying supra note 79 and discussion supra Part II.B.
261. See discussion supra Part III.
262. See id.
263. Title 25 U.S.C. § 465 states:
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, to acquire, through
purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands,
water rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations,
including trust or otherwise restricted allotments, whether the allottee be living
or deceased, for the purpose of providing land for Indians. Title to any lands or
rights acquired pursuant to this Act or the Act of July 28, 1955 (69 Stat. 392),
as amended (25 U.S.C. 608 et seq.) shall be taken in the name of the United
States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is
acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local
taxation.
25 U.S.C. § 465 (2012).
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state taxation.264 Lastly, tribes can bypass these taxes through express
exemption from state tax in state statute or by entering a controlling tribalstate compact.265
Even in the case of marijuana grown on tax-exempt lands, concerns of
marketability in those twenty-three states that currently regulate marijuana
remain. The U.S. Supreme Court continues to expressly provide states
seeking to litigate their grievances in court with alternative methods to
circumvent the advantages of tribal immunity. For example, in Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Oklahoma,266 the
Supreme Court found that although the state could not sue the tribe itself
for recovery of monies or for specific performance of its obligation to
collect state sales taxes from non-member tobacco purchasers on
reservation land, the state was not completely without remedy because
“[s]tates may of course collect the sales tax from cigarette wholesalers,
either by seizing unstamped cigarettes off the reservation,267 or by assessing
wholesalers who supplied unstamped cigarettes to the tribal stores.”268
V. A New Model for Federal Marijuana and Indian Policy: A Federal
Regulatory Framework for Tribal Marijuana Production, Manufacture, and
Retail
While the above-mentioned mechanisms for the avoidance of tax exist,
their implementation comes with a very probable side dish of extensive and
costly litigation. As domestic dependent nations, Congress has the
responsibility to enact restrictions on the rights and responsibilities of
federally recognized tribes, and the role of determining the scope of federal
Indian policy cannot be left to the courts.
When taken at face value, the flashing lights and packed parking lots of
the ever expanding Indian casinos appear to be economically benefitting the
tribes. However, “[n]early half of federally recognized Tribes in the United
264. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956) (holding that income derived from
products grown on or contained within trust land is not taxable).
265. See Lee, supra note 72. In light of the many ways a state may circumvent a tribe’s
immunity from taxation, the difficulty of enforcing tribal-state compacts, and the lack of
tribal bargaining power, it is likely that states will not contract to exempt the tribes from any
marijuana related taxes applicable therein.
266. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
267. Id. at 514 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 161–62 (1980)).
268. Id. (citing City Vending of Muskogee, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 898 F.2d 122
(10th Cir. 1990)).
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States do not operate gaming facilities at all,”269 and “[g]ambling revenue at
tribal casinos slowed in 2012, growing at a slower pace than non-tribal
casinos for the first time in nearly 20 years.”270 Of those tribes operating
successful gaming operations, there remains the possibility that some tribal
members may never receive any direct financial benefit whatsoever.271
Notwithstanding such legislative oversights, as a whole the IGRA was a
good idea and an effective means of promoting tribal economic
development. However, the IGRA’s disappointing impact on poverty and
unemployment among Native Americans272 is due in large part to the
development of Supreme Court jurisprudence creating what is essentially a
standoff of sovereign immunity,273 establishing an unjust application of the
Ex Parte Young Doctrine,274 and fostering hostility between states and
tribes by leaving states without a remedy when a tribe’s breach of a tribalstate gaming compact occurs off Indian lands.275 This jurisprudence
undermines the tribal-state compacting process and thus undermines
Congress’ careful and thoughtful balance of state and tribal interests.276
In a similar vein, profit from Indian tobacco sales has been significantly
reduced as a result of the federal PACT Act,277 state legislation relating to
the MSA,278 judicial foreclosure of tribal sovereign immunity from
taxation279 judicial refusal to recognize federal preemption protecting the
tribal tobacco market from state tax regulation.280 In addition, despite the
undaunted efforts of the White Plumes on the Pine Ridge reservation, the
269. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2043 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (citing ALAN P. MEISTER, CASINO CITY’S INDIAN GAMING REGISTRY REPORT 28
(2009-2010 ed.)).
270. Stuart Pfeifer, Indian Casino Gambling Revenue Growth Is Slowing, Report Says,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2014, http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/26/business/la-fi-moindian-casino-gambling-20140326.
271. IGRA regulations do not require tribes to make per capita payments to tribe
members. See 25 C.F.R. § 290.8 (2015); see also discussion supra Part II.A (discussing
tribal-state gaming revenue sharing).
272. See discussion supra Parts II-II.A.
273. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77-100 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
274. See id. at 76.
275. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2012).
276. See Murphy, supra note 142, at 172.
277. See discussion supra Part II.B.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See generally Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512
U.S. 61 (1994).
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production of industrial hemp remains prohibited under what appears to be
an unequivocal application of the CSA,281 making the possibility of
government confiscation and destruction of crops far too likely to support
hemp nor the taxes derived thereof as a sound investment decision.
In light of these and other similar legal doctrines that tend to favor state
and federal interests over their tribal counterparts, it is unsurprising that
tribes are in desperate need of a stable tax base.282 Fortunately, it is in the
federal government’s interest to promote tribal economic self-sufficiency
and independence from federal expenditures.283
Any decriminalization of marijuana at the federal level would certainly
be beneficial to Native American marijuana interests because marijuana
related contracts would be deemed enforceable, any uncertainties
concerning jurisdiction, choice of law, and mutually satisfactory regimes
for the collection of marijuana excise and retail taxes as between tribes and
states could be negotiated and memorialized in tribal-state compacts.284
In order to successfully balance federal interests in fostering tribal
independence with state interests in maintaining the revenue they currently
enjoy under state-legalization of marijuana, and to avoid costly litigation
that could give rise to a new body of convoluted Indian law, Congress must
get creative and do something unprecedented—something more than simply
amending the CSA or copy-and-pasting the IRS tobacco tax code,
substituting “tobacco” for “marijuana.”285
Because more than half of the states in the union are currently in
violation of federal law,286 Congress is in the unique position to condition a
state’s involvement in the marijuana industry on its agreement to tribal-state
compacting and waivers of immunity. Tribes, many in possession of
extensive land that may only viably produce cannabis,287 a historical
connection to the land, and potentially more environmentally friendly
281. See discussion supra Part II.C.
282. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
283. For example, Congress enacted IGRA after finding that “a principal goal of Federal
Indian policy is to promote tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal government.” Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, § 2, 102 Stat.
2467, 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012)).
284. See discussion supra Parts I.E-D, II.A.
285. The language of the proposed legislation is remarkably similar to that of the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that impose an excise tax on the sale of tobacco.
Compare H.R. 501 – Marijuana Tax Equity Act of 2013, discussion supra Part III, sec. 2, §§
5901-5908, with 26 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5708 (2012).
286. See discussion supra Part I.A-B.
287. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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manners of production,288 have a unique ability and opportunity to facilitate
widespread, successful, and green marijuana production.
The most desirable outcome, and a clear and simple way to mitigate the
effects of jurisprudence that deters tribal-state compacting, is for Congress
to create a new regulatory framework for the tribal marijuana market
enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. “[T]he Indian Commerce
Clause, like the Interstate Commerce Clause, is a grant of authority to the
Federal Government at the expense of the States. . . the Indian Commerce
Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the
Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause.”289 As a
result, keeping all of the future federal marijuana tax revenue and lessons
from Indian tobacco and gaming in mind, the federal regulatory scheme
should seek to accomplish eight goals. First, under a comprehensive
Marijuana act, Congress should establish a commission within the
Department of Treasury that is authorized to issue permits to marijuana
businesses in a particular state. The current proposed federal legislation
prohibits any person from growing, manufacturing or selling marijuana
without a permit issued by the Secretary of Treasury, 290 however an ideal
act would condition the issuance of such permits after a cooperative, but
independently established commission within the BIA coordinates with
local, state, and tribal governments and certifies that the particular state
either has made a good faith effort to enter into a tribal-state compact with
any federally recognized tribes located within the state, or that no such
tribes exist in the state.291 This scheme of collaboration between the BIA
and other federal agencies has been well established and is similar to IGRA
under which the NIGC works with the Office of Indian Gaming to facilitate
Indian gaming while ensuring the blanced protection of state and local
interests.292 Furthermore, concerning the potential backlash of applicantstates opposed to the good-faith negotiation requirement, at least in those
twenty-three states currently licensing and gaining tax revenue from the
marijuana industry in violation of federal controlled substance and money

288. See discussion supra Part I.D.
289. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996).
290. H.R. 499 – Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/499/text (last visited Aug. 24,
2015).
291. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the tribal-state compacting requirement of
IGRA).
292. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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laundering laws,293 such protestations ought to carry little weight and in
theory should be estopped all together.
Second, this new BIA commission must be granted the authority to
certify whether an applicant-state has in fact made a good-faith effort to
negotiate tribal-state marijuana compacts with any federally recognized
tribe within its borders, authority to promulgate marijuana related
regulations that are in the best interest of tribal self-sufficiency and
economic independence, and authority to permit applicant-tribes to
produce, manufacture and sell marijuana on Indian lands upon the tribe’s
demonstrated ability to enforce the eight priorities in the Cole
Memorandum.294
Third, the federal government needs to address several interrelated
issues. These include taking land into trust solely for purposes of marijuana
production. Permitting the BIA to take land into trust only for purposes of
production rather than retail or manufacture will work to cool any backlash
from the states and other private interests, and is easily justified by cultural
considerations buttressed by the fact that tribes are often rich in land that
may be suitable only for the growth of cannabis.295 The federal government
also needs to address issuing business grants for the development of
compliant regulatory schemes and tribal marijuana business enterprises
capable of considerable competition in the national market. In consideration
of the poverty that remains among tribes and the growing concerns about
diversion, it is essential that the federal government recognize Indian
marijuana enterprises as legitimate businesses, and accordingly issue
substantial business grants to ensure that tribes have the tools necessary to
create and enforce tribal marijuana regulation to prevent diversion, while
developing product that is capable of meaningfully competing in the
market.296
Fourth, any federal act needs to provide a mandatory model tribal-state
compact297 that expressly waives any claims of sovereign immunity from
293. See discussion Parts I.A-B.
294. See discussion supra Part I.B.
295. See discussion supra Parts I.D, II.C.
296. See discussion supra Parts I.B, I.D, II.
297. Much like the Model Escrow Statute of the Master Settlement Agreement, the
issuance of permits to marijuana businesses in a particular state containing federally
recognized tribes interested in the industry ought to be conditioned upon the enactment of a
model tribal-state compact in order to facilitate an enforcement mechanism for the
promotion of federal interests and to foster uniformity which will ultimately work to reduce
litigation. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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compulsory dispute resolution within the Commission’s federal
administrative forum;298 permits tribal-state revenue sharing only within
modest parameters which benefit tribes and are established by the Secretary
of the Interior and approved by the Commission;299 allows the imposition of
state regulation, including taxation, only with the consent of the tribe
manifest by the passage of a tribal ordinance;300 and subjects both tribal and
state officials to Ex Parte Young actions, but does not abrogate the
sovereign immunity of either sovereign from any private cause of action
outside of the designated administrative forum.301
Fifth, any federal legislation needs to expressly exempt compacting
tribes from any federal excise or income tax for a period of fifty years.302
Exemption from federal income and excise taxes, especially if the tax
remains at the proposed 50% of the sales price, will substantially improve
tribes’ ability to enter and remain in the marijuana market. The fifty year
limitation provides a meaningful reprise from federal tax permitting the
Indian marijuana industry to grow, while ensuring that the exemption will
not stand to be a permanent source of natural market frustration or tribal
dependence, again justifying the promotion of tribal self-sufficiency while
balancing state interests.
Sixth, any act should work to improve the economics of tribal
populations by expressly requiring compacting tribes to allocate income
first to per capita payments, second to the maintenance of the requisite
robust regulatory scheme, and finally to the infrastructure of the tribal
government. The requirement of revenue allocation first to per capita
payments is likely to be more directly impactful on the members of the
tribe, and consequently do more to foster tribal financial independence, than
the reverse revenue allocation provisions of the IGRA.303
Seventh, any federal legislation should expressly preempt all state
criminal jurisdiction to prosecute any and all violations of state marijuana
law by any member of a federally recognized tribe in those states certified
to receive federal permits, whether the violation occurred on Indian Lands
or otherwise. Rather than rehashing the question of criminal jurisdiction in
Indian Country that arises nearly every time Congress enacts legislation
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, an express assumption of
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See discussion supra Part II.
Id.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
Id.
See discussion supra Parts II, II.A-B.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
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exclusive federal jurisdiction over all violations of marijuana law
committed by members of federally recognized tribes will hopefully reduce
the incidence of litigation.304
Lastly, federal legislation should expressly provide that the possession,
sale, manufacture, production of marijuana within, or the diversion of
marijuana into, any state or domestic dependent nation where such conduct
or substance is unlawful shall be unlawful, and penalized solely and
explicitly under federal law. This last proposal is of utmost importance in
an ideal model. Specifically, because (in theory) state laws decriminalizing
marijuana are preempted by the CSA,305 because it will be a provision of an
Act enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause which authorizes the
stripping of more state power than does the Interstate Commerce Clause,306
because it leaves to the states and tribes the power to choose to legalize and
regulate or criminalize marijuana,307 and because it establishes a concerted
national enforcement strategy that can utilize the already existing and
robust federal drug enforcement infrastructure and employees, he
assumption of exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction over violations of state
and tribal marijuana laws after lifting the federal marijuana prohibition is
not completely without merit and further forecloses litigation over any
questions concerning the preemptive scope and force of the model Act.308
Conclusion
Currently, immense uncertainty exists in both Indian law and marijuana
law. For Native Americans, under proposed federal legislation to
decriminalize and tax marijuana, confusion will remain as to whether the
federal government has preempted state regulation, including state taxation
and the enforcement of state criminal laws. Permitting the tribes to take part
in the marijuana industry is necessary to achieve the connected goals of
promoting tribal financial independence and reducing the federal deficit,
because profit from tobacco sales free of state tax has been essentially
foreclosed, Indian Gaming operations have been reduced to profit-sharing
with states and subject to constant expensive litigation, and the CSA
prevents tribes from cultivating industrial hemp, one of the few crops that is
sustainable in much of Indian Country.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

See, e.g., discussion supra Part I.D.
See generally GARVEY, supra note 23.
See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part I.D.
See discussion supra Parts II.A-B.
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In order to realize the federal goal of promoting tribal self-sufficiency
while maintaining a balance between states and tribes in general, and in
regard to the growing marijuana industry, the federal government must at
the very least specify intended criminal and civil implications, and the role
of tribes within federal legislation decriminalizing and taxing marijuana.
Ideally, Congress will take advantage of the unique inconsistency between
federal law and state conduct to enact a comprehensive regulatory
marijuana scheme that simultaneously lifts the federal marijuana
prohibition and designates a meaningful role for federally recognized tribes
by providing a legally and fiscally sound means for interested tribes to
viably enter and compete within the growing national marijuana market.
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